CONTENTS

1. Introduction

2. The Plan

1) What is this document?

• This document presents an original framework for achieving a durable cessation of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, with the potential to redefine and perhaps even resolve the conflict as we know it.
• The framework is pragmatic and centrist, drawing on both left and right-wing thinking. It is also innovative chiefly through the introduction of the land-loss-for-violence deterence concept, which forms the heart of this proposal and which has no precedent in international relations.
• Whereas most existing proposals focus on principles and contain few concrete details, this plan is highly specific, laying out precise borders, security provisions, phased timelines, and detailed implementation steps. It leaves nothing to be determined later.
• This plan is unapologetically realistic, dispensing completely with any expectations of a warm peace in the short or medium term. Rather than aiming for reconciliation, it focuses on halting the bloodshed and creating the structural conditions for enduring stability in the region. Greater cooperation and reconciliation may eventually occur between the two sides, but that is outside the scope of this proposal.
• While many will find this plan highly controversial, the reader is urged to hold the below image in their mind when considering the bolder aspects of the proposal:

Deaths in the Israel-Palestine Conflict (Combined), 1948-2048

Conceptual (i.e. not based on real data)

2) Five convictions underlie this framework:

1. October 7 and the Gaza War stand as twin cataclysms—both in terms of national trauma and death toll (with the Gaza War far surpassing October 7 in casualties). Although many believe there is no hope for peace and are resigned to simply “managing” or “minimizing” the conflict forevermore, a descent into this level of suffering must not be allowed to recur. In the aftermath of this unprecedented devastation, we owe the people of the region—and future generations—a bold new attempt to bring about an end to the conflict, even though it may seem like a remote possibility at this point.
2. In late-2025, Israel, the Palestinians, and the region are in an entirely new strategic environment, which presents both new risks and new possibilities. There is now a unique window of opportunity where fresh, creative, and unconventional ideas for ending the conflict can and should be considered alongside more traditional approaches.
3. For Israelis, October 7 killed the “traditional” trust-based two-state solution, which in hindsight was likely not a good idea to begin with when it was attempted via the Oslo process in the 1990s. The reason is simple: the unwavering commitment of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups to destroying Israel means a Palestinian state would increase both the ability and the desire of far too many Palestinians to attack Israel. Attacks on Israel would likely begin shortly after , which would lead to ferocious counter-strikes by Israel. As a result, Palestinian statehood—without smart deterrence, security, and governance measures—would likely lead to an escalation and intensification of the conflict, rather than a reduction or even the end of the conflict. The dynamic would likely similar to the events that unfolded in Gaza in the two decades after the 2005 disengagement that culminated in the Gaza War. In other words, a peace plan without a coherent post-state (as in, Palestinian state) security doctrine is a recipe for even greater violence. In short, with a two-state solution, Hamas would be goaded into attacking Israel, and Israeli governments would be goaded into exceptionally harsh responses that kill many innocent civilians.
4. Even so, a Palestinian state alongside Israel remains the only realistic framework for long-term stability and a durable cessation of hostilities.
5. If its security can be secured, now is the time for Israel to end the military occupation of the West Bank and settle its borders once and for all. Israel should use its new-found regional hegemony to unilaterally both a) physically separate from the Palestinians and b) impose a radical deterrence mechanism to deal with the all-but-inevitable Palestinian attacks against Israel that will occur in the immediate aftermath of the creation of a Palestinian state.

3) This framework is an attempt to bring four new ideas into the conversation:

1. A Palestinian state, on Israel’s terms, needs to be imposed on the Palestinian people. This is in both Israel’s interest and in the interest of Palestinians. In other words, for a two-state solution to be achieved, unilateralism is far preferable to negotiation.
2. It is often thought that the process of establishing a Palestinian state is the hard part, but in reality the hard part is maintaining a two-state reality in such a way that it doesn’t devolve into ongoing war and the eventual re-occupation of the Palestinian State by Israel, thus bringing you back to square one (or worse) but with many lives lost. If you can figure out post-state stability in advance, it is much easier to then figure out the pathway to implementing a two-state reality. In very specific terms, those that advocate for a two-state solution need to provide a concrete plan for how Israel responds to the first Palestinian attack—whether it be a suicide bombing, rocket attack, or drone attack—that will inevitable occur in the weeks following the establishment of a Palestinian State. Does Israel bomb? What happens next?
3. Israel enacting a policy , the land-loss-for-violence mechanism that is the heart of this framework, is mechanistic and is a pre-announced and fixed consequence for violence.
4. Deradicalization is not realistic in the absence of a Palestinian state.

Finally, this framework could be considered either an ideal or permanent end state, or as a transitory state before the establishment of a confederation arrangement or some other “warmer” relationship between the state of Israel and the State of Palestine. Supporters of binationalism, confederation, or even of friendly neighbors should seriously consider the arrangement outlined in this framework as a realistic bridge, if that’s the path that future generations wish to take. Having said that, this framework would be in place for many decades, rather than a few years, in order for a later move toward warmer relations or more integration to be viable. Without this bridge, visions of close integration or even a binational state will remain not only fantastical, but dangerous.